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When Does Corporate 




How does corporate social performance (CSP) affect financial performance 
as the firm expands internationally? To address this question, I integrate 
arguments from the International Business (IB) literature and the literature on 
CSP to propose that the costs and benefits associated with CSP are unevenly 
distributed across the range of internationalization. Specifically, I argue that 
the costs of CSP outweigh the benefits at low levels of internationalization, 
while the benefits outweigh the costs at high levels of internationalization, 
leading to a moderated, U-shaped relationship. In addition, I disentangle 
CSP’s effects further by distinguishing between “do-good” CSP and “do-
no-harm” CSP, which have been theorized to evoke different stakeholder 
perceptions and attributions and can thus be expected to harbor different 
performance effects across the range of internationalization. Analysis of a 
panel of 1,056 U.S.-based international firms over the period 1995-2012 
lends support to these arguments.
Keywords
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How does corporate social performance (CSP) affect firm financial perfor-
mance as the firm expands internationally? Given that both CSP and interna-
tionalization are important issues for firms, this is a relevant question—but 
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one to which we thus far lack answers. Although the extensive body of research 
on the performance effects of CSP has generated mixed results (Crane, 
Henriques, Husted, & Matten, 2017), scholars generally agree that CSP not 
only comes at a cost to the firm (Fisher-Vanden & Thorburn, 2011; Gao & 
Slawinski, 2015; Wang & Bansal, 2012) but can also generate benefits that 
may offset or even exceed those costs (Flammer, 2015; Kacperczyk, 2009; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Such performance-
enhancing benefits have been explained, for example, through mechanisms 
such as reduced costs of contracting (Jones, 1995), consumers’ increased will-
ingness to pay (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), enhanced reputation (Brammer 
& Millington, 2005), and stakeholder influence capacity (Barnett, 2007).
Scholars have extended these ideas to theorize about CSP’s potential value 
to international firms, defined here as firms that sell into foreign markets 
(Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). CSP can reduce the “costs of doing business 
abroad” (Eden & Miller, 2004; Sethi & Judge, 2009) because it conveys 
important information about the international firm’s “overall reliability, sta-
bility, and credibility” (Doh, Littell, & Quigley, 2015, p. 112). Such informa-
tion can boost perceptions of social acceptability, or “legitimacy” (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999), in the eyes of local stakeholders, which is of particular impor-
tance to international firms given the “liabilities of newness and foreignness” 
they face in overseas markets (Marano, Arregle, Hitt, Spadafora, & van 
Essen, 2016). Yet, while evidence exists to support the claim that CSP is 
received positively in overseas markets (Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014; 
Marano, Tashman, & Kostova, 2017; Prakash & Potoski, 2006), others argue 
that it is just as likely to be regarded with skepticism and distrust (Jamali, 
2010; Jeppesen, List, & Folmer, 2002; Kellenberg, 2009; Mazutis & 
Slawinski, 2015). As such, CSP’s performance effects in the international 
context remain unclear.
To address this issue, I integrate arguments from the International Business 
(IB) literature and the literature on CSP to propose that the costs and benefits 
associated with CSP are unevenly distributed across the range of internation-
alization. The IB literature has generated substantial evidence to show that 
internationalization itself has nonlinear performance effects, with numerous 
studies suggesting that financial performance deteriorates as firms pass 
through lower levels of internationalization, before improving again at higher 
levels of internationalization (Capar & Kotabe, 2003; Cardinal, Miller, & 
Palich, 2011; Contractor, Kumar, & Kundu, 2007; Gaur & Kumar, 2009). 
This “U-shaped curve” thus encompasses the negative effects of a lack of 
legitimacy at low levels of internationalization and the positive effects of 
legitimacy’s gradual acquisition at higher levels of internationalization 
(Ruigrok, Amann, & Wagner, 2007). Linking these ideas to the notion that 
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CSP also has legitimating properties, I hypothesize that CSP and internation-
alization interact to generate a moderated, U-shaped financial performance 
curve.
That is, because firms at lower levels of internationalization are still rela-
tively unknown in the international marketplace, they are more likely to face 
legitimacy assessments formed on the basis of limited information, bias, or 
stereotypes (Campbell, Eden, & Miller, 2012; Pant & Ramachandran, 2012). 
Such assessments can translate to higher costs in the form of, for example, 
adverse contracting terms, longer negotiations, or more intensive communi-
cation (Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Elango, 2009; Mezias, 2002), and 
thus negatively affect financial performance. I argue that in this context of 
relative unfamiliarity, international firms’ CSP is also more likely to be 
regarded with skepticism, such that it fails to deliver the legitimacy-based 
benefits which would otherwise offset its costs, driving performance down 
further. However, as the firm reaches higher levels of internationalization, its 
greater familiarity and established international track record lead to more 
positive perceptions overseas (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), and thus more posi-
tive performance effects. In this context of greater familiarity, CSP is more 
likely to engender the attributions of trustworthiness, reliability, and having 
stakeholders’ “best interests at heart” (Suchman, 1995, p. 578) that underpin 
the mechanisms driving enhanced financial performance.
In addition, I disentangle CSP’s effects further by distinguishing between 
“do-good” CSP and “do-no-harm” CSP (Crilly, Ni, & Jiang, 2016, p. 1316). 
The former refers to voluntary activities that create social value but are not 
prescribed by law or social norms, such as corporate philanthropy or affirma-
tive action policies, while the latter refers to efforts to limit the social costs of 
business by ensuring that some minimum standards are maintained, such as 
in the realm of environmental degradation or product safety (Lin-Hi & 
Blumberg, 2018). Recent research suggests that although do-good CSP is 
more costly than do-no-harm CSP, the former engenders positive attributions 
in foreign markets, while the latter invokes frames of negative intent and 
perceptions of inauthenticity (Crilly et al., 2016). Thus, I argue that the costs 
and benefits associated with do-good CSP are of greater magnitude and more 
unevenly distributed than those of do-no-harm CSP, leading to more pro-
nounced shifts in performance across the range of internationalization.
To explore these hypothesized relationships, I analyze a panel of 1,056 
U.S.-based international firms consisting of 9,914 firm-year observations 
over the period 1995-2012. Consistent with my theorizing, I find that stron-
ger CSP is associated with positive performance overall, but also interacts 
with the level of internationalization to produce greater negative performance 
effects as firms move through lower levels of internationalization and greater 
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positive performance effects as firms move through higher levels of interna-
tionalization. Furthermore, my analysis reveals that the effects of do-good 
CSP are contingent upon the level of internationalization, while the effects of 
do-no-harm CSP are not. Specifically, the stronger the do-good CSP, the 
more negative the impact on financial performance at lower levels of interna-
tionalization and the more positive the impact at higher levels of internation-
alization. In contrast, stronger do-no-harm CSP is associated with more 
positive—but marginally decreasing—performance effects across the full 
range of internationalization. These findings are robust to a number of con-
trols, alternate measures of performance, and a host of robustness checks 
aimed at isolating within-firm effects and accounting for autocorrelation and 
endogeneity.
My study leads to two main contributions. First, based on integration of 
arguments from the IB literature with the literature on CSP, my analysis 
enhances our understanding of when CSP contributes to performance as 
firms internationalize (Doh et al., 2015; Marano et al., 2017; Stahl, Tung, 
Kostova, & Zellmer-Bruhn, 2016). My findings add an international dimen-
sion to the notion that CSP’s costs and benefits are unevenly distributed over 
time (Flammer & Bansal, 2017) and suggest that most firms are “under-inter-
nationalized” with respect to the performance-enhancing effects of CSP. 
Second, in line with research suggesting that do-good CSP is associated with 
not only higher costs but also greater potential benefits than do-no-harm CSP, 
I show that the performance effects vary significantly when CSP is decom-
posed into these two constituent components (Crilly et al., 2016; Lin-Hi & 
Blumberg, 2018; Mattingly & Berman, 2006). Specifically, the effects of do-
good CSP vary with the level of internationalization, while those of do-no-
harm CSP do not. These findings have bearing on how we understand the 
trade-offs between these two approaches to CSP.
Theory and Hypothesis Development
Firms in today’s business environment face complex challenges. Not only are 
they pressured to consistently report high levels of financial performance 
(Barton & Wiseman, 2014), they also face stakeholders’ “ratcheting expecta-
tions” with respect to their CSP (Bertels & Peloza, 2008; Chiu & Sharfman, 
2011) and an increasingly competitive global business environment in which 
those expectations manifest (Jamali, 2010; Johnson & Greening, 1999). To 
complicate matters further, CSP is a multidimensional construct that reflects 
both efforts to achieve positive social externalities—“do good”—and efforts 
to mitigate negative ones—“do-no-harm” (Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Strike, 
Gao, & Bansal, 2006). Scholars have theorized that these two dimensions of 
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CSP affect stakeholder perceptions in different ways, particularly in the inter-
national context (Crilly et al., 2016), and thus likely have unique consequences 
for performance. Yet, thus far, we lack a clear understanding of how CSP and 
its two constituent dimensions affect financial performance as firms expand 
internationally.
At its core, financial performance is a function of the revenues generated 
through business activities minus the costs incurred to engage in those activi-
ties. In theorizing about the financial performance effects of CSP under inter-
national expansion, I emphasize that both CSP and internationalization are 
associated with costs and potential benefits. Strong CSP not only harbors the 
potential to generate benefits that lead to positive financial outcomes but also 
requires firms to divert resources away from more short-term productive pur-
poses (Fisher-Vanden & Thorburn, 2011; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). 
Similarly, international expansion offers the prospect of growth and econo-
mies of scale, but typically requires firms to incur additional costs above 
those they would normally face at home, negatively affecting firms’ profit 
margins (Eden & Miller, 2004; Lu & Beamish, 2001). In the following sec-
tions, I endeavor to integrate these two streams of research by theorizing that 
the ability of CSP to positively affect the financial performance of interna-
tionalizing firms varies by the level of internationalization.
CSP and Financial Performance
Numerous studies have considered the relationship between CSP and finan-
cial performance over the past several decades (Crane et al., 2017; Margolis 
& Walsh, 2003; Wang, Dou, & Jia, 2016). While some have questioned the 
theoretical foundations of such a relationship in light of conceptual confusion 
surrounding the CSP construct itself (Rowley & Berman, 2000), most studies 
consider CSP a coherent construct that represents the aggregate accumulation 
over time (Barnett, 2007) of “a company’s actions that appear to further some 
social good, beyond the interests of the company itself” (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001, p. 117). In addition, while some have questioned the empirical 
reality of such a relationship based on the notion that costs and benefits asso-
ciated with CSP are likely to simply offset (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), a 
cautious consensus seems to have emerged that CSP is associated with posi-
tive, albeit modest financial performance effects (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; 
Shahzad & Sharfman, 2017).
Recognizing that there are nontrivial costs associated with achieving and 
sustaining strong CSP (Barnett, 2007) such as diverted financial resources, 
managerial time, and managerial attention (Fisher-Vanden & Thorburn, 2011; 
Gao & Slawinski, 2015; Wang & Bansal, 2012), research has focused on 
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explicating mechanisms through which CSP can have positive effects on 
financial performance, such as by motivating employees, boosting reputation 
among consumers, or helping secure more advantageous contractual agree-
ments with suppliers (Flammer, 2015; Flammer & Luo, 2017; Jones, 1995; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Although this research has made important contri-
butions, some have cautioned against assumptions of a universal relationship 
and emphasized that any such effects are likely to be contingent upon other 
factors (Barnett, 2007; Rowley & Berman, 2000). For instance, it has been 
suggested that CSP’s performance effects may depend on its relative level 
compared with that of other firms (Barnett & Salomon, 2012) or on features 
of the institutional environment (Wang et al., 2016).
In addition to considering differences between firms, research has investi-
gated within-firm variance over time. This is particularly relevant given that 
in general, the costs associated with CSP need to be incurred up front, while 
any benefits will only materialize later—if they materialize at all (Flammer 
& Bansal, 2017). This is in large part because the mechanisms through which 
CSP can enhance performance depend on stakeholder perceptions and attri-
butions, which evolve over time (Brammer & Millington, 2008). That is, 
ample evidence suggests that stakeholders must be aware of the firm’s CSP 
(Servaes & Tamayo, 2013) and also make positive attributions based on that 
CSP for it to engender positive outcomes (Crilly et al., 2016; Donia & Sirsly, 
2016; Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Lin-Hi & Blumberg, 2018). For 
example, research in this vein suggests that CSP will be regarded with skepti-
cism if it is perceived to be driven by strategic motives (Dean, 2003) and that 
such perceptions are associated with negative financial performance out-
comes (Muller & Kräussl, 2011). In contrast, CSP that is perceived to be 
sincere or authentic will evoke the positive attributions that move stakehold-
ers in ways that reward the firm (Godfrey, 2005; Mazutis & Slawinski, 2015). 
In sum, evidence suggests a modest positive relationship between CSP and 
performance, but one that can vary for a given firm as stakeholder percep-
tions evolve over time.
Internationalization and Financial Performance
The relationship between a firm’s level of internationalization and its finan-
cial performance also continues to be a topic of great scholarly interest 
(Marano et al., 2016). While disagreement persists as to the exact form of the 
relationship (for recent overviews, see, for example, Cardinal et al., 2011; 
Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006; Kirca et al., 2011; Tsai, 2014), most 
agree that internationalization is a challenging endeavor associated with both 
costs and benefits (Abdi & Aulakh, 2018; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010; 
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Denk, Kaufmann, & Roesch, 2012; Fortanier, Muller, & van Tulder, 2007; 
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Zhang, Zhong, & Makino, 2015). International 
markets offer opportunities in the form of increased market scope, scale 
economies, and leveraging learning and best practices across markets (Capar 
& Kotabe, 2003; Contractor, Kundu, & Hsu, 2003) but typically require firms 
to incur higher costs as well (Eden & Miller, 2004; Lu & Beamish, 2001).
These “costs of doing business abroad” (Eden & Miller, 2004; Sethi & 
Judge, 2009) can arise due to numerous factors. While some are essentially 
market driven, such as higher freight and insurance costs, foreign exchange 
costs, and trade barriers, others stem from a lack of familiarity with regula-
tions, norms, and ways of conducting business in the foreign market that 
make it difficult to establish and manage relationships with local stakeholders 
(Clark, Pugh, & Mallory, 1997; Contractor et al., 2003; Forsgren, 2002). 
These difficulties are rooted in the fact that local stakeholders are unfamiliar 
with the international firm, and thus form initial perceptions of the interna-
tional firm’s reliability and trustworthiness on the basis of relatively simplis-
tic heuristics that involve limited information, bias, or stereotypes (Campbell 
et al., 2012).
Such perceptions can lead to a heightened sense of caution, skepticism, or 
even outright hostility (Jeppesen et al., 2002; Pant & Ramachandran, 2012; 
Stahl et al., 2016), which force the international firm to incur costs through, 
for example, more intensive search efforts, longer negotiations, more fre-
quent communication, adverse contracting terms, or even litigation (Adair 
et al., 2001; Elango, 2009; Mezias, 2002). Even the tension and frustration 
management experiences as a result of these issues can lead to costs in the 
form of lower productivity (Daamen, Hennart, Kim, & Park, 2007). The 
implication is that as firms continue their international expansion, the increas-
ing share of relatively lower margin foreign sales in the firm’s total sales 
should gradually drive down the firm’s overall profitability.
Consequently, a considerable body of research has explored factors that 
help firms to overcome such liabilities. Learning has been a particular focus 
of such research, because learning about and conforming to expectations 
overseas are said engender the positive perceptions that lead to the conferral 
of legitimacy in foreign markets (Denk et al., 2012; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; 
Ruigrok et al., 2007). Legitimacy is an important precondition for preferen-
tial access to stakeholder resources and support, and thus vital for perfor-
mance (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). Accordingly, initial negative assessments 
based on oversimplified heuristics increasingly make way for more positive 
assessments based on incurred experience with the international firm or even 
the referrals of others (Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007). Based on such ideas, 
several scholars have theorized a “U-shaped” relationship between 
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internationalization and financial performance, where the costs of expansion 
outweigh the benefits at lower levels of internationalization, but the benefits 
outweigh the costs at higher levels of internationalization (Capar & Kotabe, 
2003; Contractor et al., 2007; Lu & Beamish, 2001; Ruigrok & Wagner, 
2003).1
An Integrated Perspective on CSP and Internationalization
The two strands of scholarship reviewed above have established that both the 
relationship between CSP and performance and the relationship between 
internationalization and performance are shaped by the evolving, socially 
constructed attributions stakeholders make about the firm and its intentions. 
A number of scholars have identified synergies between these perspectives, 
noting that CSP and internationalization appear to go hand in hand (Gao & 
Slawinski, 2015; Strike et al., 2006). It has been suggested, for example, that 
higher levels of internationalization are associated with higher levels of cor-
porate philanthropy abroad (Cowan, Huang, Padmanabhan, & Wang, 2013), 
and that such efforts are typically aimed at mobilizing stakeholder support 
(Reimann, Ehrgott, Kaufmann, & Carter, 2012). As such, many tout CSP on 
account of its legitimating properties overseas, because it signals a willing-
ness to conform to global “meta-norms” of how to treat the social environ-
ment (Marano et al., 2017, p. 387).
However, with respect to investments in CSP, there is “no guarantee that 
these efforts always pay off” in the international context (Crilly et al., 2016, 
p. 1316). This is because information like the firm’s CSP is typically inter-
preted in the context of other potentially relevant available signals (Dineen & 
Allen, 2016). Although some have theorized that CSP can compensate for 
negative legitimacy perceptions, information about international firms’ CSP 
is not likely to precede, or substitute for, other sources of information: Rather, 
it will be interpreted in the context of assumptions of motive, which will be 
inferred from other available sources. For instance, the expectation of nega-
tive externalities associated with an international firm’s market entry could 
cast its CSP efforts in a negative light instead of a positive glow (P. Jones, 
Comfort, & Hillier, 2005). Specifically, the simplified heuristics discussed 
previously (Campbell et al., 2012) will amplify perceptions of the interna-
tional firm as a member of the “out-group” (Crilly et al., 2016), increasing the 
likelihood that its CSP will be viewed as an attempt at ingratiation. As a 
result, the firm will fail to obtain the benefits that would otherwise derive 
from positive attributions of its CSP (Godfrey, 2005).
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By implication, the performance effects of CSP among international 
firms should vary with the level of internationalization. Because interna-
tional firms at lower levels of internationalization are less well known 
abroad, they face more negative legitimacy assessments and thus deterio-
rating performance overall as the international component of their overall 
activity grows (Campbell et al., 2012; Pant & Ramachandran, 2012). 
Under those circumstances, their CSP is also more likely to be regarded 
with skepticism, meaning that the costs incurred to achieve strong CSP 
will not be offset by any related benefits, such that performance is driven 
down further. In contrast, at higher levels of internationalization, when an 
international reputation for trustworthiness is more firmly established 
(Chiu & Sharfman, 2011; Crilly et al., 2016; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 
2008; Suchman, 1995), strong CSP is more likely to be perceived as a 
sincere signal that leads to more positive attributions, thereby enhancing 
the performance-enhancing mechanisms described above. Accordingly, I 
hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 1: The performance effects of CSP are contingent upon the 
firm’s level of internationalization, such that CSP negatively affects per-
formance at lower levels of internationalization and positively affects per-
formance at higher degrees of internationalization.
Do-Good CSP Versus Do-No-Harm CSP
When considering perceptions and attributions, scholars have increasingly 
emphasized the importance of disaggregating CSP into its constituent “do-
good” and “do-no-harm” components (Crilly et al., 2016; Jo & Harjoto, 
2012; Lin-Hi & Blumberg, 2018; Rowley & Berman, 2000; Muller & Kräussl, 
2011). Do-good CSP reflects proactive strategies that create social value, 
while do-no-harm CSP refers to efforts to limit the social costs of business 
(Crilly et al., 2016). Do-good CSP is a function of voluntary activities that 
may go beyond law or even social norms, such as corporate philanthropy, 
corporate affirmative action policies, or cause-related marketing, and can be 
seen as “giving back” to society (Lin-Hi & Blumberg, 2018). In contrast, do-
no-harm CSP stems from efforts to attenuate negative externalities by ensur-
ing that some minimum standards are maintained in areas such as employee 
safety, environmental degradation, and product safety (Campbell, 2007). 
With respect to the costs of CSP, the distinction matters: As an expression of 
firms “just doing what they have to do,” do-no-harm CSP requires more mod-
est resource commitments than do-good CSP (Lin-Hi & Blumberg, 2018, p. 
189).
Muller 1563
Moreover, recent research suggests that do-good CSP and do-no-harm 
CSP are perceived in very different ways (Crilly et al., 2016). Specifically, 
attribution theory predicts (and experimental evidence supports) the notion 
that stakeholders react more favorably to do-good CSP because it is consid-
ered “nice to see, but not expected” (Lin-Hi & Blumberg, 2018, p. 189). By 
contributing to societal well-being in ways that exceed role expectations, 
firms engaging in do-good CSP enjoy positive attributions based on percep-
tions of sincerity and authenticity (Crilly et al., 2016). With respect to do-no-
harm CSP, research has paid less attention to the attributions associated with 
the absence of negative externalities than to the attributions associated with 
their presence (Lin-Hi & Blumberg, 2018). Although the presence of harm 
has been shown to weigh disproportionately heavily in the minds of the 
observer (Kölbel, Busch, & Jancso, 2017; Lange & Washburn, 2012), recent 
research suggests that the absence of harm does not generate positive attribu-
tions in the same way that the presence of harm generates negative ones. This 
is because stakeholders are likely to see do-no-harm CSP as compliance-
induced instead of motivated by authenticity (Cording, Harrison, Hoskisson, 
& Jonsen, 2014). Paradoxically, the more negative attributional thinking 
associated with harm actually frames do-no-harm CSP in negative terms, 
eliciting more scrutiny and inviting skepticism regarding motivation (Crilly 
et al., 2016).
This asymmetry is likely to be accentuated in the context of international 
expansion. Maintaining strong CSP across their operations as they expand 
abroad requires firms to increase their CSP-related investments, which enjoy 
only limited scalability across borders (Devinney, McGahan, & Zollo, 2013; 
Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). Because the costs associated with do-good CSP 
are greater than those associated with do-no-harm CSP, greater increases in 
resource commitments are required to maintain a given level of do-good CSP 
as the firm passes through the range of international expansion than to main-
tain a given level of do-no-harm CSP. However, because of do-no-harm 
CSP’s limited potential to generate positive attributions (Crilly et al., 2016), 
international firms also derive fewer benefits from that do-no-harm CSP as 
they internationalize. In sum, the costs associated with maintaining strong 
do-good CSP are greater across the range of internationalization than the 
costs associated with maintaining strong do-no-harm CSP, but the potential 
rewards that can offset those costs are also relatively greater. I hypothesize as 
follows:
Hypothesis 2: Do-good CSP is associated with more pronounced shifts in 
financial performance across the range of internationalization than do-no-
harm CSP.
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Method
To test these hypotheses, I constructed a panel data set consisting of all U.S. 
firms that appear in the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) database over 
the period 1995-2012 (18 years) for which matching financial data could be 
obtained through Compustat. KLD is one of several highly utilized databases 
that tracks firms’ social performance and has been validated in numerous 
studies (Hart & Sharfman, 2015; Mattingly, 2017; Shahzad & Sharfman, 
2017). This initial data set comprised 1,765 firms and a total of 15,628 firm-
year observations. I then omitted firms that had no observable international-
ization over the entire period (i.e., firms whose foreign sales = 0 for all 
available firm-years) because the firm-fixed effects models require that the 
variables of interest be time-variant. After omitting all such firms as well as 
firm-year observations with missing values, I retained a panel of 1,056 U.S. 
firms and 9,914 firm-year observations.
Measures
Performance. I measured the dependent variable performance as return on 
assets (ROA), which is a commonly used measure of corporate financial per-
formance in studies on the performance effects of both CSP and internation-
alization (Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Ruigrok & 
Wagner, 2003). The measure was constructed by dividing reported net 
income by total assets, both of which were drawn from Compustat, and win-
sorized at the 2% level. ROA speaks to the ability of a firm’s deployed assets 
to generate returns for the firm and is thus a logical measure of financial 
performance. However, I test alternate specifications (discussed below) 
based on return on sales (ROS) and Net Income as alternate measures (Bar-
nett & Salomon, 2012), generating similar results.
Internationalization. Numerous measures of the level of internationalization 
exist in the literature, including ratios such as foreign assets to total assets or 
foreign employees to total employees, as well as more complex measures such 
as geographic dispersion of subsidiaries or the number of foreign countries in 
which the firm operates (Hsu & Boggs, 2003). As Ruigrok and colleagues 
(2007) point out, the measure used will also reflect the conceptualization of 
internationalization under study. The ratio of foreign sales to total sales (FS/
TS) has been shown in numerous studies to adequately capture exposure to 
foreign markets (Contractor et al., 2003; Hennart, 2011; Ruigrok et al., 2007). 
As my theorizing refers to firms expanding their sales into foreign markets, I 
use the ratio of FS/TS as my measure of internationalization. However, to 
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account for the geographic scope of internationalization, I control for the 
number of regions those foreign sales are spread across (see below).
CSP. In line with extant research (Choi & Wang, 2009; Koh, Qian, & Wang, 
2014), I operationalized overall CSP by creating an aggregated net difference 
score across the dimensions of social performance captured by the KLD data-
base. KLD documents whether a firm demonstrates “strengths” and “con-
cerns” across subdimensions in seven main categories: the environment, 
community involvement, product safety, corporate governance, employee 
relations, human rights, and diversity (Wharton Research Data Services 
[WRDS], 2015). Strengths are associated with the identification of activities 
across each of the seven dimensions that generate positive externalities, such 
as the use of clean energy, strong corporate philanthropy programs, or poli-
cies that promote work–life balance or gender equality. Concerns are associ-
ated with activities across each of the seven dimensions that generate negative 
externalities, such as toxic emissions, tax disputes, labor unrest, or involve-
ment in controversial industries. Importantly, in monitoring companies’ 
social performance, KLD tracks their international activities (cf. Strike et al., 
2006). Thus, KLD scores can be considered a measure of a firm’s overall CSP 
across the various markets it conducts business in.
To construct the CSP measure used to test Hypothesis 1, I first subtracted 
the number of concerns per dimension from the number of strengths per 
dimension (Choi & Wang, 2009; Koh et al., 2014). Because not all dimen-
sions comprise the same number of subdimensions, and because KLD has 
changed the numbers of subdimensions at various points over the years (Shiu 
& Yang, 2017), I then standardized the scores for each dimension to make the 
scores comparable across dimensions and across time (Choi & Wang, 2009). 
The aggregate CSP measure represents the average of these net differences 
across the seven dimensions, winsorized at the 2% level. While others have 
used only five of the seven dimensions (Choi & Wang, 2009; Koh et al., 
2014), it is not clear a priori why CSP on any of the seven dimensions would 
not affect legitimacy perceptions. In addition, using all the information con-
tained in the KLD data enhances construct validity (cf. Kang, 2016). However, 
I note that the seven-dimension measure correlates at .9 with the five-dimen-
sion measure, and the results generated using the five-dimension measure are 
virtually identical to those reported below.
To operationalize do-good CSP and do-no-harm CSP (Hypothesis 2), I 
adopted a similar procedure as for the composite CSP score described above, 
but measured a firm’s KLD strengths (do-good CSP) and concerns (do-no-
harm CSP) separately. For do-good CSP, I standardized each of the seven 
dimensions of KLD strengths across the full sample and then took the 
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average of these seven standardized items per firm per year. For do-no-harm 
CSP, I standardized each of the seven dimensions of KLD concerns across 
the full sample and then took the average of these seven standardized items 
per firm per year. Given that more concerns represent higher levels of harm, 
I reverse-coded the averaged, standardized concern scores so that a higher 
number represents fewer concerns, and thus a higher do-no-harm score.2 All 
three measures—CSP overall, do-good CSP, and do-no-harm CSP—are win-
sorized at the 2% level.
Control Variables
I controlled for a number of additional factors known to relate to firm perfor-
mance. First, I controlled for firm size, operationalized as the firm’s total 
sales (log-transformed), based on the notion that size relates to purchasing 
power and the potential for scale economies, and thus is a commonly used 
predictor of firm performance. Second, I controlled for reported R&D expen-
ditures and advertising expenditures, given that extant literature links such 
expenditures to performance (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). Third, I con-
trolled for leverage, as debt financing affects profitability. I measured lever-
age as total liabilities divided by total assets. Fourth, I controlled for 
diversification, as managers in diversified firms face more and increasingly 
diverse information across a wider range of businesses and face a more 
diverse constellation of stakeholders, which could negatively affect perfor-
mance (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Oh & Contractor, 2012). I operation-
alized diversification using an entropy score, where diversification = ∑i[Pi × 
ln(1/Pi)], in which Pi is the sales attributed to each self-reported business 
segment i and ln(1/Pi) is the weight given to each business segment (Goerzen 
& Beamish, 2003). To calculate this entropy score, I omitted all nonoperating 
segments, such as “corporate,” “unallocated,” or “adjustments.” The continu-
ous controls (size, diversification, leverage) are winsorized at the 2% level.
In addition, to account for the fact that a given foreign sales percentage can 
vary in its level of geographic dispersion, I also controlled for geographic 
scope of internationalization based on the number of foreign regions that 
could be identified in each firm’s geographic segment reporting. That is, while 
firms rarely report their sales on a country-by-country basis, they do typically 
break down their reported sales into “geographic segments,” where a segment 
may be an individual country (e.g., “Germany”), but is more typically some 
aggregation of countries or even regions (e.g., “Europe” or “EMEA” [Europe, 
Middle East and Africa]). Accounting regulations afford companies consider-
able latitude with respect to the identification of segments and the level at 
which they are aggregated, such that the exact segments reported vary 
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considerably across firms, and over time. These issues preclude a consistent 
and reliable breakdown of the exact amount of sales attributable to clearly 
identifiable foreign regions across firms and over time.
To address some of this heterogeneity, I manually recoded each reported 
(non-U.S.) segment as representing sales in one or more of seven identifiable 
foreign regions: “Africa,” “Asia,” “Europe,” “Latin America,” “Middle 
East,” “(Non-U.S.) North America,” and “Pacific.” Specific countries were 
classified in terms of their regional membership and reported segments that 
touched on multiple regions were disaggregated (e.g., the reported segment 
“Middle East and Africa” represents both “Middle East” and “Africa”). 
Segments which could not be attributed in this way (e.g., “Foreign,” “Other,” 
“Eastern Hemisphere”) were recoded as “Undetermined.”3 Thus, the control 
for geographic scope of internationalization ranges from 0 to 7, with 23% of 
the observations reporting activities in one identifiable region, 18% reporting 
two, 14% reporting three, 9% reporting four, and 12% reporting at least five. 
Observations for which no specific foreign regions could be identified (i.e., 
where the regional dimension of foreign sales remained “Undetermined”) 
took a value of 0 for this measure.
Results
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are reported in Table 1. Table 
1 shows that the average financial performance for all firms over the 18-year 
period was 0.048, with a standard deviation of 0.09. The value for interna-
tionalization averaged 34% with a standard deviation of 0.25. In terms of 
correlations, Table 1 reveals several variables to be positively correlated with 
financial performance (size, advertising, leverage, CSP), while others are 
negatively correlated with financial performance (R&D expenditures, inter-
nationalization, geographic scope).
CSP and Internationalization
I adopted a firm-fixed effects approach, given that I am interested in analyz-
ing the impact of firm-level variables that can vary over time, while control-
ling for time-invariant differences between firms. Fixed-effects models 
address misspecification errors identified in cross-sectional studies (Margolis 
& Walsh, 2003; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Significant Hausman test results 
(χ2 = 184.63, p < .01) also indicated that a fixed-effects approach was pre-
ferred over a random-effects approach. To account for temporal effects that 
may be present, such as those associated with the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results of the tests for Hypothesis 1 are presented in Table 2. Model 1a 
captures the effects of the control variables on performance (ROA), in addition 
to the main effects of CSP and internationalization. While the main effect of 
internationalization is nonsignificant, the main effect of CSP is significantly 
positive (β = 0.006, p < .01). In Model 1b, I introduced the quadratic term 
internationalization2. As expected, the main effect for internationalization is 
Table 2. Firm-Fixed Effects Models of CSP and Financial Performance of 
International Firms.
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c
 β SE β SE β SE
Constant −0.181 0.018*** −0.176 0.018*** −0.177 0.018***
Size 0.041 0.002*** 0.042 0.002*** 0.042 0.002***
Diversification −0.012 0.003*** −0.012 0.003*** −0.012 0.003***
Leverage −0.073 0.016*** −0.073 0.016*** −0.073 0.016***
R&D 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004
Advertising −0.003 0.006 −0.003 0.006 −0.003 0.006
Geographic scope
 1 −0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004
 2 −0.004 0.004 0.000 0.004 −0.001 0.004
 3 −0.007 0.005 −0.004 0.005 −0.004 0.005
 4 −0.014 0.005** −0.011 0.005** −0.012 0.005**
 5 −0.011 0.006** −0.008 0.006 −0.008 0.006
 6 −0.004 0.008 −0.002 0.008 −0.002 0.008
 7 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.008
CSP 0.006 0.002*** 0.006 0.002** 0.013 0.005***
Internationalization −0.012 0.009 −0.116 0.020*** −0.111 0.020***







Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 9,914 9,914 9,914
Number of firms 1,056 1,056 1,056
F statistic 27.71*** 28.01*** 29.20***
R2 (within) .089 .092 .101
Note. CSP = corporate social performance.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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now significantly negative (β = −0.116, p < .01), while the quadratic term is 
significantly positive (β = 0.133, p < .01). This indicates a curvilinear, 
“U-shaped” internationalization–performance relationship consistent with 
prior literature.4 The coefficient for CSP remained statistically significant (β 
= 0.006, p < .01). In Model 1c, I introduced the interactions between CSP 
and internationalization, and CSP and internationalization2. Model 1c reveals 
significant negative interactions between CSP and internationalization (β = 
−0.064, p < .05) and significant positive interactions between CSP and inter-
nationalization2 (β = 0.080, p < .05). These findings imply that CSP ampli-
fies the negative financial performance effects that exist at lower degrees of 
internationalization and the positive performance effects that exist at higher 
degrees of internationalization, consistent with Hypothesis 1.
To visualize these effects, I graphed the marginal effects of international-
ization on performance at −1 and +1 standard deviations of CSP (Figure 1). 
Given that internationalization in my sample takes a mean value of 0.34 
(with a standard deviation of 0.25), Figure 1 indicates that overall, most firms 
during the 1995-2012 period found themselves on the left side of the U-shaped 
curve. These findings suggest that most firms are insufficiently international 
to leverage the potential for benefit from their CSP.
Turning to the respective curves, Figure 1 shows that the slopes of the 
curve for strong-CSP firms are steeper than the slopes of the curve for 
Figure 1. The interactive effects of CSP and internationalization on financial 
performance.
Note. Estimated marginal effects of Model 1c in Table 2. Estimates produced for CSP at 1 
standard deviation above and below the mean. CSP = corporate social performance.
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weak-CSP firms. Bearing in mind that the average financial performance in 
the sample takes a value of 0.048 (standard deviation 0.09), Figure 1 implies 
that as a firm with weak CSP moves from the lowest level of internationaliza-
tion to its inflection point at about 43% foreign sales, its ROA will drop from 
just under 6% to just over 4% (a drop of 33%, in nominal terms) before 
returning to about 5.5% at the highest degree internationalization. In contrast, 
the ROA of a firm with strong CSP will drop from over 7% to just over 4% (a 
drop of nearly 45%, in nominal terms) before climbing back to just over 7% 
at the highest degree internationalization. Thus, the magnitude of the perfor-
mance effect of strong CSP over the range of internationalization is nearly 
50% greater than that of weak CSP. At a median total asset value of US$1.6 
billion, a 3 percentage point swing in ROA equates to US$48 million in 
profits.
Do-Good CSP Versus Do-No-Harm CSP and Internationalization
To test Hypothesis 2, I reestimated Model 1c in Table 2, substituting the over-
all CSP measure with the measures for do-good CSP and do-no-harm CSP, 
respectively (Table 3). I first report do-good CSP and do-no-harm CSP sepa-
rately (Models 2a and 2b), before incorporating both together (Model 2c). 
Collectively, the models in Table 3 show a consistent picture, in which the 
positive financial performance effects of do-good CSP vary across the range 
of internationalization, while the financial performance effects of do-no-
harm CSP do not. These results provide support for Hypothesis 2.
Graphing this output (Figure 2a and 2b) leads to a number of observations. 
Figure 2a, for instance, not only reveals that the curve is more leptokurtic in 
the case of do-good CSP than for CSP overall (Figure 1), but it also shows 
that the inflection point occurs at a lower level of internationalization when 
do-good CSP is strong versus when it is weak. The implication is one of a 
virtuous spiral of legitimacy, in which multiple sources of positive informa-
tion enable stakeholders to form more positive legitimacy assessments, and 
to do so sooner. In contrast, Figure 2b not only shows a performance effect 
for do-no-harm CSP that is positive overall but also suggests that costs 
increasingly outweigh benefits as the firm passes through the range of 
internationalization.
Robustness Checks
I conducted a number of robustness checks, related to model specifications as 
well as the operationalization of variables. First, I specified Model 1c in 
Table 2 with ROS and net income as dependent variables (winsorized at the 
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2% level). ROS is a common alternate operationalization of financial perfor-
mance, and using net income instead of a ratio such as ROA or ROS can 
Table 3. Firm-Fixed Effect Models of Do-Good Versus Do-No-Harm CSP on the 
Financial Performance of International Firms.
Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c
 β SE β SE β SE
Constant −0.175 0.018*** −0.183 0.018*** −0.184 0.018***
Size 0.042 0.002*** 0.042 0.002*** 0.042 0.002***
Diversification −0.013 0.003*** −0.013 0.003*** −0.013 0.003***
Leverage −0.073 0.016*** −0.074 0.016*** −0.073 0.016***
R&D 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004
Advertising −0.004 0.006 −0.003 0.006 −0.003 0.006
Geographic scope
 1 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004
 2 −0.001 0.004 0.000 0.004 −0.001 0.004
 3 −0.004 0.005 −0.004 0.005 −0.004 0.005
 4 −0.011 0.005** −0.011 0.005** −0.011 0.005**
 5 −0.009 0.006 −0.008 0.006 −0.009 0.006
 6 −0.003 0.008 −0.002 0.008 −0.003 0.008
 7 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008
Internationalization −0.113 0.020*** −0.114 0.020*** −0.109 0.020***
Internationalization2 0.128 0.023*** 0.130 0.023*** 0.122 0.023***
Do-Good CSP 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.005
Do-Good CSP × 
Internationalization
−0.047 0.024** −0.045 0.024*
Do-Good CSP × 
Internationalization2
0.071 0.028** 0.068 0.028**
Do-No-Harm CSP 0.016 0.005*** 0.017 0.005***
Do-No-Harm CSP × 
Internationalization
−0.014 0.027 −0.024 0.027
Do-No-Harm CSP × 
Internationalization2
−0.005 0.033 0.008 0.034
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 9,914 9,914 9,914
Number of firms 1,056 1,056 1,056
F statistic 26.43*** 26.77*** 24.84***
R2 (within) .089 .092 .094
Note. CSP = corporate social performance.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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overcome the deficiencies associated with ratios, in which the independent 
variables can influence the numerator, the denominator, or both (Barnett & 
Salomon, 2012). Both alternate measures (not reported here) generate similar 
results as those produced with ROA, the only qualitative difference being that 
the interaction between CSP and internationalization is nonsignificant when 
net income is the dependent variable.
Second, firm-fixed effects models focus on within-firm differences over 
time, while the data—in particular, given the incorporation of interaction 
terms—also contain meaningful information on between-firm differences. I 
adopt a “hybrid approach” (Certo, Withers, & Semadeni, 2017) to parse out 
both within-firm and between-firm effects, and thus to identify whether the 
effects hypothesized here are truly within-firm or not. The hybrid approach 
splits each independent variable into two variables: (a) a centered variable 
(x xit i− ), which allows for analysis of within-firm changes over time, and (b) 
a variable representing the mean value ( xi ), which allows for between-firm 
comparisons. Random-effects models are then used to estimate coefficients 
representing both the within- and between-firm effects of each independent 
variable.
In Table 4, I report the results of a hybrid model with the overall measure 
of CSP as a predictor, as well as hybrid models based on do-good CSP and 
do-no-harm CSP. These models are revealing in a number of ways. Most 
importantly, the effects hypothesized here and presented in Tables 2 and 3 as 
“within-firm” effects are confirmed in Table 4. In addition, Table 4 reveals no 
significant between-firm effects in terms of the level of internationalization 
Figure 2. The interactive effects of CSP and internationalization on financial 
performance, do-good CSP versus do-no-harm CSP.
Note. Estimated marginal effects of Models 2a and 2b in Table 3, with each CSP measure at 1 
standard deviation above and below the mean. CSP = corporate social performance.
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or the level of internationalization in interaction with CSP. As such, the 
hybrid models support the perspective presented here, in which these effects 
Table 4. Random-Effects Models of Between Versus Within Effects of CSP on the 
Financial Performance of International Firms.








 β SE β SE β SE
Constant 0.022 0.013* 0.017 0.015 −0.020 0.014
“Between” effects
 Size 0.011 0.001*** 0.011 0.002*** 0.016 0.002***
 Diversification −0.004 0.005 −0.006 0.005 −0.005 0.005
 Leverage −0.071 0.026*** −0.061 0.027** −0.094 0.027***
 R&D −0.013 0.005*** −0.010 0.005** −0.011 0.005***
 Advertising 0.017 0.004*** 0.018 0.005*** 0.018 0.004***
 CSP 0.063 0.018*** 0.006 0.014 0.068 0.015***
 Internationalization 0.036 0.033 0.050 0.034 0.048 0.033
 Internationalization2 −0.048 0.038 −0.060 0.039 −0.053 0.038
 CSP × Internationalization −0.152 0.107 −0.043 0.078 −0.116 0.087
 CSP × Internationalization2 0.118 0.131 0.065 0.096 0.055 0.109
“Within” effects
 Size 0.041 0.002*** 0.041 0.002*** 0.042 0.002***
 Diversification −0.012 0.003*** −0.013 0.003*** −0.013 0.003***
 Leverage −0.074 0.016*** −0.075 0.016*** −0.075 0.016***
 R&D −0.003 0.006 −0.004 0.006 −0.003 0.006
 Advertising 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.004
 CSP 0.014 0.005*** 0.002 0.005 0.016 0.005***
 Internationalization −0.111 0.019*** −0.112 0.019*** −0.113 0.019***
 Internationalization2 0.127 0.023*** 0.128 0.023*** 0.129 0.023***
 CSP × Internationalization −0.064 0.027** −0.048 0.024** −0.013 0.027
 CSP × Internationalization2 0.078 0.033** 0.070 0.028** −0.006 0.033
Firm-fixed effects No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Geographic scope control Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 9,914 9,914 9,914
Number of firms 1,056 1,056 1,056
Wald χ2 statistic 1,053.07*** 1,024.95*** 1,078.07***
R2 (between) .135 .118 .147
R2 (within) .092 .092 .092
R2 (overall) .115 .103 .121
Note. CSP = corporate social performance.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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are specific to individual firms as they pass through the range of internation-
alization, and not a function of different firms being situated at different lev-
els of internationalization with different levels of performance.
In addition, panel data can present issues of bias stemming from endoge-
neity and autocorrelation. For instance, CSP and internationalization may be 
endogenously determined, in light of studies suggesting that internationaliza-
tion and social performance may go hand in hand (Strike et al., 2006). 
Similarly, it may also be that past financial performance plays into the deci-
sion whether to expand internationally or affects the availability of resources 
with which to invest in CSP (Gao & Slawinski, 2015; Kang, 2013; Strike 
et al., 2006). Autocorrelation occurs when the error term (ε) is first-order 
autoregressive, that is, ε at t is correlated with ε at t − 1 (Choi & Wang, 2009). 
Autocorrelation is likely to be present in my data given that year-on-year 
variation in company financials is, to some extent, path dependent (Barnett & 
Salomon, 2012). A Wooldridge test for serial autocorrelation supported this 
suspicion, F(1, 1001) = 1,139.67; p > F = .000.
While the use of firm-fixed effects help to account for these issues to some 
degree, I undertook three additional steps in an effort to address them further, 
reported in Table 5. First, I lagged the predictors by 1 year to address the 
potential for simultaneous or reverse causality. These results, reported in 
Model 4a, are consistent with those reported in Table 2. With respect to auto-
correlation, an autoregressive model (xtregar in Stata), which employs a 
panel-by-panel Cochrane–Orcutt transformation to difference out the correla-
tions between error terms, offers a more robust specification (Choi & Wang, 
2009). These results, reported in Model 4b, are strongly consistent with those 
reported in Table 2.
Finally, to take a more rigorous approach to the endogeneity issue, I fol-
lowed the approach of Sanders and Hambrick (2007) by incorporating addi-
tional controls in the form of CSP and internationalization’s predicted values. 
By incorporating CSP (predicted) and internationalization (predicted), along 
with the quadratic term for internationalization (predicted) and all their 
respective interactions (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003), it is possible to better 
isolate the residual effects of CSP and internationalization that are not 
explained by any significant relationships they may have with each other or 
with the dependent variable.
To generate these predicted values, I regressed CSP and internationaliza-
tion, respectively, on the other variables in the model from the previous year 
(including the dependent variable ROA). As this approach requires that at 
least some of the variables are significant predictors of CSP and/or interna-
tionalization, I note here for completeness that variance in CSP from t = 0 to 
t + 1 is explained by variance in ROA from t − 1 to t = 0, but not by variance 
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in internationalization. In contrast, variance in internationalization from 
t = 0 to t + 1 is explained neither by variance in ROA nor CSP from t − 1 to 









 β SE β SE β SE
Constant 0.032 0.019* 0.125 0.013*** 0.069 0.028**
Size −0.001 0.003 −0.014 0.003*** 0.000 0.003
Diversification −0.009 0.003*** −0.009 0.004** −0.007 0.003**
Leverage 0.218 0.017*** 0.217 0.020*** 0.183 0.019***
R&D −0.009 0.006 −0.005 0.008 −0.009 0.007
Advertising 0.002 0.004 −0.003 0.005 −0.002 0.005
Geographic scope
 1 −0.001 0.004 −0.002 0.005 0.003 0.005
 2 −0.003 0.004 −0.004 0.005 0.002 0.005
 3 −0.011 0.005** −0.013 0.006** −0.008 0.006
 4 −0.011 0.005** −0.010 0.007 −0.006 0.006
 5 −0.006 0.006 −0.001 0.007 −0.002 0.007
 6 −0.010 0.008 −0.011 0.009 −0.010 0.009
 7 −0.001 0.008 −0.003 0.010 0.003 0.009
CSP (predicted) 0.194 0.303
Internationalization (predicted) −0.363 0.195*
Internationalization2 (predicted) 0.290 0.279
CSP × Internationalization 
(predicted)
−1.044 1.715
CSP × Internationalization2 
(predicted)
0.941 2.432
CSP 0.010 0.005* 0.012 0.007* 0.013 0.006**
Internationalization −0.064 0.021*** −0.049 0.029* −0.050 0.024**
Internationalization2 0.099 0.025*** 0.095 0.034*** 0.097 0.028***
CSP × Internationalization −0.106 0.030*** −0.113 0.037*** −0.114 0.032***
CSP × Internationalization2 0.159 0.037*** 0.158 0.045*** 0.164 0.039***
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes No Yes
Number of observations 8,695 7,649 7,552
Number of firms 1,046 1,009 1,005
F statistic 21.52*** 10.02*** 16.19***
R2 (within) .085 .025 .084
Note. All predictors lagged. Model 4b does not include year dummies as the xtregar specification does not 
allow for inclusion of time series operators. CSP = corporate social performance.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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t = 0 (but is explained by other variables). The specification including these 
controls (Model 4c) suggests that my findings are robust to endogeneity 
concerns.
Finally, I graphed the results of Model 4c to determine whether any effects 
absorbed by these endogeneity controls affected the overall interpretation of 
the results (Figure 3). Figure 3 suggests that when accounting for possible 
endogeneity, the most robust dynamics occur in the context of strong CSP, 
which is consistent with the perspective outlined above.
Discussion
In this article, I integrate arguments from the IB literature with the literature 
on CSP to propose that the costs and benefits associated with CSP are 
unevenly distributed across the range of internationalization. Both literatures 
highlight the costs associated with achieving strong CSP and with interna-
tional expansion, and both literatures explicate perception-based mechanisms 
underlying benefits which may offset or even surpass costs. Furthermore, a 
key assumption in both literatures is that costs are likely to outweigh benefits 
in the short term, while benefits are likely to outweigh costs in the long term. 
Parsing out the respective effects of CSP’s constituent elements, do-good 
Figure 3. The interactive effects of CSP and internationalization on financial 
performance, controlling for endogeneity.
Note. Curves show estimated marginal effects of Model 4c in Table 5. Estimates produced 
for CSP are at 1 standard deviation above and below the mean. CSP = corporate social 
performance.
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CSP and do-no-harm CSP, offers an additional level of nuance in explicating 
how CSP affects the performance of internationalizing firms. Analysis of a 
set of 1,056 U.S. international firms from 1995 to 2012 consisting of 9,914 
observations provides support for these ideas.
Theoretical Contributions
My study contributes to research on business and society in two primary 
ways. First, it enhances our understanding of when CSP contributes to the 
performance of firms as they expand internationally (Doh et al., 2015; 
Marano et al., 2017; Stahl et al., 2016). Although extant research has thus far 
only superficially explored these relationships, many scholars assume that 
CSP is valued in international markets (Muller & Kolk, 2010; Prakash & 
Potoski, 2006), while others claim it will be regarded with skepticism (Jamali, 
2010; Jeppesen et al., 2002; Kellenberg, 2009). Rooted in the notion that 
CSP’s costs and benefits are unevenly distributed over time (Flammer & 
Bansal, 2017), my perspective helps to reconcile these two views. Given that 
perceptions and attributions are fundamental to CSP’s potential to generate 
financial value (Crilly et al., 2016; Godfrey et al., 2009; Mazutis & Slawinski, 
2015), my findings form indirect evidence that international firms’ CSP is 
interpreted differently as the international firm goes from being a relatively 
unknown quantity at low levels of internationalization to being a well- 
recognized player at high levels of internationalization. By implication, my 
findings suggest that CSP does not substitute for other heuristics on whose 
basis overseas stakeholders may form their legitimacy assessments, but rather 
that CSP is interpreted in the context of such heuristics. This aligns with the 
notion that legitimacy is more of an ongoing process than it is a state (Bitektine 
& Haack, 2015; Pant & Ramachandran, 2012) and offers a dynamic perspec-
tive that extends beyond recent research on stakeholder perceptions of inter-
national firms and attributions of their CSP (Crilly et al., 2016).
Second, in line with research suggesting that do-good CSP is associated 
with not only higher costs but also greater potential benefits than do-no-harm 
CSP (Crilly et al., 2016; Lin-Hi & Blumberg, 2018; Mattingly & Berman, 
2006), I show that the effects of do-good CSP vary with the level of interna-
tionalization, while those of do-no-harm CSP do not. These findings thus 
integrate the idea that the cost of do-good CSP is higher than the cost of do-
no-harm CSP with the notion that perceptions of authenticity and “social con-
nectedness” (Mazutis & Slawinski, 2015, p. 137) are important mediation 
mechanisms driving CSP’s performance-related outcomes. Given that the 
costs and benefits of these two forms of CSP are distributed in different ways 
over time, and thus over the course of international expansion, these findings 
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have bearing on how we understand the trade-offs between these two 
approaches to CSP. This interpretation leads to a perspective in which do-no-
harm is best understood as a short-term risk mitigation strategy, whereas do-
good CSP is best conceptualized as a strategy that bears fruit over the long 
term. Collectively, the findings presented in this article can inform future 
research aimed at better understanding the mechanisms underlying CSP’s 
legitimating properties in the international context (Marano et al., 2017; 
Muller & Kolk, 2010; Stahl et al., 2016).
Managerial Implications
These findings also have consequences for management. First, the fact that 
the positive performance effects of CSP are only realized at above-average 
levels of internationalization suggests that managers expecting CSP to com-
pensate for a lack of legitimacy overseas need to rethink their strategy. My 
results suggest that CSP is not a substitute for other sources of legitimacy in 
early stages of internationalization, in particular those that arise from direct 
interaction with local firms. A reputation for strong CSP does not precede the 
firm, but rather is only interpreted in the context of established familiarity. 
This means that while CSP can certainly reinforce other legitimacy signals, it 
does not pave the way for internationalization. The implication is that firms 
wishing to garner benefits through international expansion still have to earn 
them the old-fashioned way: by being a good, trustworthy business partner. 
CSP helps to add value only when the international firm becomes a known 
quantity.
In addition, weaker financial performance at lower degrees of internation-
alization need not necessarily be seen as a negative outcome, but rather as a 
form of investment in the development of stable business relationships in 
current, as well as future, overseas markets. At the same time, given that my 
study shows that the average firm in my sample is on the “down-” (i.e., left-) 
side of the curve in Figure 1, managers of firms for which international 
expansion is a strategic goal in its own right would do well to recognize that, 
from a performance aspect, their firm may be “under-internationalized.” 
Finally, managers should understand that do-good CSP and do-no-harm CSP 
are not simply two sides of the same coin. The differing distribution of costs 
and benefits over time and, thus, over the range of internationalization means 
that each relates to financial performance in very different ways. Firms inter-
ested in short-term risk mitigation may focus on strategies aimed at do-no-
harm CSP, while firms interested in long-term social (and financial) value 
should focus on strategies aimed at do-good CSP.
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Limitations
My study is also subject to limitations. For one, although my analysis is based 
on a large sample of international firms with sales spanning the globe over an 
18-year period and controls for the geographic scope of those sales, it does 
not account for a diverse range of home-country contexts. U.S. firms may be 
assessed overseas based on a particularly strong set of assumptions or stereo-
types than firms from other countries, and thus may experience a deeper and 
longer downward performance trajectory as they expand abroad to other 
countries. On the contrary, the United States may be considered a context 
with a higher level of generalized trust, and thus U.S. firms may experience a 
more positive reception in overseas markets than firms from other countries. 
Future research might explore whether specific, country-of-origin-related 
heuristics alter relationships identified here (cf. Campbell et al., 2012; 
Marano et al., 2016).
My conceptualization is also not intended to suggest that local, contextual 
features of individual foreign markets have no importance, given that geog-
raphy is clearly an important factor in organizations’ social behaviors (Muller 
& Whiteman, 2009, 2016). It may be, for instance, that under very high levels 
of institutional distance, the legitimating properties of CSP become more (or 
possibly less) important than other sources of (business-related) information 
conveyed through expanding commitment to the international arena. Thus, 
future research might consider the interplay between contextual factors and 
firm-specific attributions of character. Relatedly, while KLD scores cover the 
entirety of a firm’s operations and thus are inherently international, I acknowl-
edge that my treatment of CSP does not fully account for cross-country dif-
ferences in stakeholders’ understandings and expectations (Rathert, 2016; 
Wijen, 2014). However, in the context of my theorizing, my argument is that 
CSP is more than just firms’ accommodation of an increasingly diverse array 
of utilitarian, stakeholder-specific interests; rather, CSP can be understood in 
terms of the legitimacy-enhancing properties of the positive attributions it 
generates and the financial performance effects associated with them 
(Godfrey, 2005). Future scholars might develop a qualitatively richer 
approach to offer a more fine-grained perspective on the relationships inves-
tigated here.
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Notes
1. Although some studies have revealed a downturn in performance at very high 
levels of internationalization (Contractor, Kundu, & Hsu, 2003; Lu & Beamish, 
2004; Ruigrok, Amann, & Wagner, 2007), this seems to apply to a limited num-
ber of settings.
2. This led to identification of 64,433 non-U.S. geographic segments over the 
period under study, which broke down as follows: Africa, 2,041; Asia, 11,387; 
Europe, 15,740; Latin America, 3,486; Middle East, 2,135; Non-U.S. North 
America, 7,552; and Pacific, 3,875. The remaining (Undetermined) segments 
(18,217) could not be attributed to any region. More detailed information is 
available upon request.
3. An alternate operationalization is to sum across the standardized strengths and 
concerns, respectively, to calculate the do-good and do-no-harm measures, as 
has been done in prior studies (cf. Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Strike, Gao, & 
Bansal, 2006). However, operationalizing in such a manner leads to a consider-
ably more skewed measure due to the amplification effects of summing. Also, 
in contrast to the analyses reported in these prior studies, my specifications are 
based on panel data and incorporate firm-fixed effects. This within-firm focus 
over time has the effect that the two approaches are qualitatively similar and lead 
to virtually identical results.
4. I also tested for a cubic relationship between internationalization and financial 
performance (the “horizontal S-curve,”) but the coefficient for the cubic term 
was statistically nonsignificant.
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